Auction Theory Deep Dive

Revenue equivalence, Myerson optimal, combinatorial, GSP, empirical auction methods.
TUTORIALS

Auction Theory Deep Dive

Revenue equivalence, Myerson optimal, combinatorial, GSP, empirical auction methods.

All-pay auctions and the economics of lobbying

auction-theory-deep-dive
all-pay-auction
lobbying
rent-seeking

Analyse the all-pay auction in R where all bidders pay their bids regardless of winning, derive the symmetric equilibrium with uniform values, and apply the model to lobbying, rent-seeking, and political campaigns.

May 8, 2026

Common-value auctions and the winner’s curse

auction-theory-deep-dive
common-value-auctions
winners-curse
information-economics

Derive, simulate, and visualize the winner’s curse in common-value auctions: why naive bidding leads to systematic overpayment, and how rational bidders correct for the informational content of winning.

May 8, 2026

The English Ascending Auction

auction-theory-deep-dive
english-auction
ascending-auction
dominant-strategy

Implement the button auction (Japanese) model of the English ascending auction, prove that bidding up to one’s value is weakly dominant, derive expected revenue, and compare with sealed-bid formats under uniform and log-normal value distributions.

May 8, 2026

First-price sealed-bid auction — equilibrium bidding strategies

auction-theory-deep-dive
first-price-auction
bayesian-nash
bid-shading

Derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction in R, show bid-shading as a function of the number of bidders, and compare revenue across auction formats.

May 8, 2026

GSP auction for online advertising

auction-theory-deep-dive
gsp-auction
online-advertising
mechanism-design

Analyze the Generalized Second-Price auction used by search engines: compute VCG payments vs GSP equilibrium payments, show that GSP is not truthful, and characterize locally envy-free equilibria.

May 8, 2026

Revenue equivalence theorem

auction-theory-deep-dive
revenue-equivalence
auction-formats
mechanism-design

State, prove, and numerically verify the Revenue Equivalence Theorem across four standard auction formats — first-price, second-price, Dutch, and English — with simulations showing when RET holds and when it breaks down.

May 8, 2026
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